Commit Graph

4 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Marcos c58c00181e fix(review): read the AI-USAGE opt-in at render time, not at review start
The previous two commits put the label re-read in the webhook, at review
start. That is too early to help: the review claims on the AI-REVIEW event
and the re-read runs milliseconds later, while the reviewer's second click
(AI-USAGE) is still a second or two away. It would have kept 404ing quietly
if the path fix hadn't landed, and even fixed it caught nothing.

Move the check to where the decision is actually used — just before the
usage block is rendered, after the model has run. That is a minute or more
after the trigger, by which time the label is there. Attribution is computed
in the same branch, so a late opt-in still gets its per-comment token lines.

`pr_has_label` goes through the existing gitea_get helper, which owns the
/api/v1 prefix, so the path can't drift again. Any failure returns False and
the payload's verdict stands: a review is never lost over a usage section.

Reverts the webhook-side re-read from 4ef62f2 and aedea97.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01B11e8TZZxJyzHW7jj7KWUN
2026-08-20 23:35:04 +00:00
Marcos aedea973ab fix(webhook): label re-read must hit /api/v1, not the bare host
GITEA_API is the host with no version prefix — ai_review._get / _post append
/api/v1 per call. The re-read helper didn't, so it 404'd on every review and
silently fell back to the payload's verdict: "could not re-read labels for
gitea_admin/pragent#10: HTTP Error 404" in the pod log, usage block still
missing. Caught by labelling PR #10 AI-REVIEW then AI-USAGE, which is the
exact sequence the fix exists to handle.

Test asserts the composed URL, since a wrong path here fails silently by
design (the helper swallows errors so a review is never lost over a usage
section).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01B11e8TZZxJyzHW7jj7KWUN
2026-08-20 23:29:03 +00:00
Marcos 4ef62f28bb fix(webhook): re-read PR labels at review start so a late AI-USAGE counts
Labelling a PR is two webhook events. AI-REVIEW arrives first, the review
claims (repo, index, sha) and starts; the AI-USAGE event that follows a
moment later hits the in-flight dedupe and is dropped. `report_usage` was
snapshotted from the first payload, which had not seen AI-USAGE yet, so the
review posted without its usage block even though the label was on the PR by
the time it finished — observed on gitea_admin/pragent#9 (`usage=False` in
the pod log, no <details> section in the posted review).

Re-read the labels from the API at review start and upgrade the flag. The
read is best-effort: any failure logs and returns [], leaving the payload's
verdict intact, because a usage section is not worth failing a review over.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01B11e8TZZxJyzHW7jj7KWUN
2026-08-20 23:24:54 +00:00
Marcos 8c491a7626 harden(pilot): contain hostile PR content, bound the webhook, fix anchoring
The reviewer runs an opencode agent with `bash: "*": allow` over a checkout of
the PR author's branch, and the pod holds a Gitea Write credential. Those two
facts had no wall between them.

Security
- _build_env now allow-lists the subprocess environment instead of inheriting
  it, so PRAGENT_BOT_TOKEN and WEBHOOK_SECRET never reach the agent. This was
  the live hole: a PR body or an AGENTS.md could ask the agent to `curl` the
  token out, and it had both the value and the tool.
- sanitize_workdir deletes author-controlled agent-instruction files from the
  checkout before opencode starts (AGENTS.md at any depth, CLAUDE.md,
  .cursorrules, a repo opencode.json/.opencode, copilot-instructions.md).
  opencode loads nested AGENTS.md as instructions, so a PR could otherwise ship
  its own system prompt. They are still reviewed, as data.
- The brief fences PR title/body and diff in --- UNTRUSTED --- markers under a
  trust-boundary preamble; the pragent agent, the three lens subagents and the
  review-methodology skill now treat injection attempts as a critical finding
  to report rather than an instruction to obey.
- .pr-review.json is read from the PR's base branch, not the head sha. Its
  `instructions` field is spliced into the reviewer's prompt, so head-ref
  reading let any author rewrite the reviewer's rules. Fields are length-capped.
- Untar rejects escaping symlinks, parent traversal, and writes through a
  planted symlink (tar-slip).
- The image runs as uid 10001 instead of root.

Robustness
- Bounded review concurrency (PRAGENT_MAX_CONCURRENT_REVIEWS, default 2). Each
  review forks an opencode process; a thread per delivery was a fork bomb on a
  burst of labels or Gitea retries.
- An in-flight (repo, index, sha) claim closes the check-then-act race in the
  sha-marker dedupe, where two deliveries a second apart both read "not yet
  reviewed" and both posted.
- Request bodies are capped before being read into memory.

Correctness
- parse_diff_anchors counts a whitespace-stripped blank context line. Skipping
  it desynced the new-line counter for the rest of the hunk and silently
  misplaced every later inline comment in that file.
- post_inline_review's body-only fallback folds the anchored findings into the
  body. It previously posted a summary saying "N inline comment(s) below" with
  no comments and no findings — losing them all on the one path that matters.
- fetch_pr_diff's files-endpoint fallback emits real a// b/ prefixes (so
  changed_files and the anchor parser work on it) and reports both HTTP statuses
  in its error instead of the same one twice.
- The CI workflow template pins PRAGENT_ENGINE=ollama; review_pr defaults to
  opencode, which does not exist on a Gitea Actions runner.

Tests: 68 -> 101, covering each of the above.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01B11e8TZZxJyzHW7jj7KWUN
2026-08-18 04:44:44 +00:00