Claude 2f96e66aab feat(pilot): behavioural scorers, feedback ground truth, and an eval dataset
Adds the evaluation layer on top of the review traces: five deterministic
scores describing how the reviewer behaved, a bridge that turns human reactions
into ground truth, and a dataset seeded from the reviews already run.

The two are kept apart on purpose. feedback.db has recorded 113 reviews and
zero reactions, resolutions or replies — nobody has ever responded to a bot
comment — so an accuracy metric cannot be built yet. The scorers therefore
measure behaviour, which is computable from data in hand, and feedback_scores
turns verdicts into scores the moment any arrive.

eval_scores.py emits finding_rate, severity_info_ratio, severity_max,
dropped_findings and cost_per_finding into the same ingestion batch as the
trace. Undefined values are omitted rather than reported as zero: an info ratio
over a silent review is undefined, and charting it as 0 would read as perfect
calibration.

dropped_findings needed a parser change. Both parsers silently discard findings
with an unusable path/line, which made a model emitting garbage locations
indistinguishable from one that found nothing. last_parse_dropped() exposes the
delta, read at parse time — after apply_repo_config the drops are the config
working as intended, not the model misbehaving.

feedback_scores.py scores the session ("{repo}#{pr}"), because feedback arrives
days later against a PR and nothing records which re-run produced which
comment. review_acceptance is absent rather than 0 when nothing was engaged.

eval_bootstrap.py registers the score configs, seeds the pragent-reviews
dataset, and can backfill scores onto traces that predate the scorers.
expectedOutput is the reviewer's own prior output, flagged
labelled_by_human: false — a regression baseline, not verified truth.

Also fixes a silent telemetry failure: the ingestion endpoint answers 207 when
only some events succeed, so a batch with every event rejected still looked
like success. Score events were missing the required per-event timestamp and
ingested nothing while reporting 207. _warn_on_rejected_events now logs the
per-event errors under LANGFUSE_DEBUG.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-31 14:22:55 +00:00

pragent

An AI pull-request reviewer for Gitea that posts inline comments with suggested fixes, not a wall of prose — and reports what each review cost.

A webhook wakes for any PR on a repo whose default branch carries a .pr-review.json with "enabled": true. The service checks the repo out at the PR's head commit, reads the changed files and the code around them, runs the repo's own linters, and posts a review anchored to real lines.

See it work: pragent-demo PR #1 — a PR with planted defects, and the review it drew: 9 findings, 3 critical, all anchored inline.

**[CRITICAL]** search_notes builds its SQL by string concatenation: owner and
term come from request['query'] and are spliced directly, so a term like
`' OR 1=1 --` reads every row in the table.

Fix: Parameterise owner and term with placeholders and a real LIKE pattern.

🪙 ~362 tok (11% · attributed output)

Why this exists

CodeRabbit, Greptile and Qodo are good products with fixed review dimensions and per-seat pricing. pragent targets the case where a platform team needs to add its own dimensions — an internal compliance rule, a service-catalog ownership check, a house performance idiom — without forking a vendor's reviewer. The analyzers, the data, and the analytics are yours.

It is also self-hosted end to end: the model endpoint is a config value, so the code never has to leave your network.

Status

A pilot is live and reviewing real PRs. The full framework (pragent init, tiering as code, analyzer fan-out, explain / replay) is designed but not built — see docs/plans/.

What works today:

  • a central webhook service, so onboarding a repo is add the bot + commit .pr-review.json:enabled = true
  • whole-repo context: the reviewer reads callers and types, not just the hunk
  • inline comments with language-highlighted suggested fixes, anchored to post-change lines and validated in Python before posting
  • per-commit dedupe, and prior reviews fed back so a re-push synthesises rather than repeats
  • .pr-review.json for per-repo focus and house rules (also the opt-in flag)
  • token-usage reporting on every review, measured from opencode step_finish events
  • containment against hostile PR content (see Security)

Not yet: status checks, fail-close, attention tiering enforced in code (it is currently a skill the agent follows), multi-model routing.

How a review runs

PR opened on repo with `.pr-review.json:enabled = true`
   │  Gitea webhook (HMAC-verified, body-capped, concurrency-bounded)
   ▼
review_pr()
   1. opt-in    .pr-review.json:enabled=true on base? if not, skip.
   2. dedupe    already reviewed this exact sha? stop.
   3. fetch     diff + .pr-review.json from the BASE branch
   4. checkout  repo archive at head sha → temp workdir
   5. sanitize  delete author-controlled agent-instruction files
   6. brief     .pragent/brief.md, untrusted parts explicitly fenced
   7. review    opencode agent: read code, run linters, emit findings JSON
   8. anchor    validate every line against the diff's post-change lines
   9. post      inline comments + summary, as pragent-bot

Steps 1, 3, 8 and 9 are deterministic Python. The model's only job is step 7 — producing correct findings. It never talks to Gitea, and a finding whose line does not validate becomes a summary bullet rather than a misplaced comment.

Setup

Onboarding a repo, once the service is running for that owner:

  1. add pragent-bot as a Write collaborator
  2. commit .pr-review.json: {"enabled": true} to the repo's default branch
  3. open a PR

Standing up the service itself — the webhook, the image, the Gitea SSRF allow-list, the per-owner webhook registration — is in pilot/README-webhook.md. A legacy per-repo CI-step path is in pilot/README.md.

The model endpoint is supplied at runtime via PRAGENT_MODEL_BASE_URL; the committed opencode.json carries a placeholder.

Per-review token spend, latency and equivalent cost are shipped to a self-hosted Langfuse, split into ollama and claude environments so the two spend stories stay separate: pilot/README-langfuse.md. Emission is a silent no-op unless LANGFUSE_HOST and the key pair are set.

Extending it

The review "factory" is .opencode/ — agent definitions and skills as plain Markdown. Adding a review dimension is dropping a file in, not writing code:

Add How
A review lens .opencode/agents/<name>.md + one allow-list line in pragent.md
Domain knowledge .opencode/skills/<name>/SKILL.md, referenced from the load table
Per-repo rules .pr-review.json in the repo being reviewed

Shipped skills: attention-tiering (the cost governor), review-methodology, findings-schema, linter-playbook, security-lens, malicious-change, comment-craft.

Security

The reviewer runs an autonomous agent with shell access over a checkout of the PR author's branch, and its bot account holds a Write credential. Anyone who can open a PR can therefore put arbitrary text in front of the model and arbitrary files on its disk — the setup exploited in the April 2026 disclosures against Claude Code Security Review, Gemini CLI Action and Copilot Agent.

Four controls, none of which rely on the model behaving:

  1. No credentials in the agent's environment. The subprocess environment is built from an allow-list, not inherited. There is nothing to exfiltrate.
  2. No author-controlled instruction files on disk. Nested AGENTS.md, CLAUDE.md, .cursorrules, a repo opencode.json — all deleted before the agent starts, so a PR cannot ship its own system prompt. They are still reviewed, as data.
  3. Untrusted-data framing. PR text and diffs are fenced; the agent reports injection attempts as critical findings instead of following them.
  4. Reviewer config comes from the base branch, so a PR cannot rewrite the rules it is judged by.

Plus: tar-slip guards on the archive, a non-root container, and bounded concurrency. Full threat model and residual risks: pilot/README-webhook.md.

What it costs

The pilot runs against a self-hosted model and bills nothing per token, but the token work is real. pilot/cost_model.py prices it against published API rates, calibrated against runs measured through the usage telemetry (OBSERVED_RUNS in that file — append to it, don't guess). Tokens are summed from opencode step_finish events per review.

Two measured reviews of a ~1100-line PR in this repo: 28 and 31 agent steps, ~2.1M input tokens each, zero cache reads or writes. The demo repo's PR, same tier: 126K tokens.

Model this repo, ~1100-line PR demo repo PR
Claude Opus 5 ~$10.79 ~$0.71
Claude Sonnet 5 ~$4.32 ~$0.28
Claude Haiku 4.5 ~$2.16 ~$0.14

Three things that estimate wrong if you skip them:

  1. The loop resends its context every step. Cost is roughly quadratic in step count, not linear in diff size. This is what attention-tiering exists to cap.
  2. Repository size dominates diff size. The 16x gap above is the same reviewer on the same tier — the difference is how much repo there was to read.
  3. Prompt caching is worth about a third of the bill and is not currently happening on this stack. Check cache_read before budgeting.
python3 pilot/cost_model.py --help      # other mixes, volumes, models

Development

python3 -m pytest tests -q    # 137 tests, stdlib only, no network

The pilot is stdlib-only Python by design — it runs from a bare python:slim image with the scripts mounted, and has no dependency resolution to go wrong at review time.

License

Not yet chosen. Until one is added, no reuse rights are granted.

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Description
An AI pull-request reviewer for Gitea — inline findings with suggested fixes, whole-repo context, and per-review cost reporting.
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