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solvecraft/crates/engine/src/control_auth.rs
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DuBearte bda32419bd Windows: a stuck icacls no longer freezes SolidCraft when it writes the control token (#6145) (#6182)
* claim: #6145

* Windows: a stuck icacls no longer freezes SolidCraft when it writes the control token (#6145)

Writing the control token runs icacls to drop the file's inherited
permissions, and waited for it without a limit. On some computers the
new icacls process stays suspended, so connecting an agent froze the app
for good. It now waits at most 5 s; an icacls still running then is ended
and the token written anyway, into the user's own local app data folder.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-25 01:56:01 +00:00

498 lines
22 KiB
Rust

//! The control channel's per-launch token (docs/control-protocol.md). `solidcraft --control PORT`
//! makes a random token, writes it to a file only the user can read
//! ([`token_path`]) and refuses every connection whose first request doesn't carry it, so other
//! users on the same machine (loopback is shared, on Windows across remote-desktop sessions too)
//! can't drive the app. Clients find it with [`client_token`]. Next to it, `<port>.pid` names
//! the process that wrote it, so a client refused with a leftover token can say the file is stale.
use std::io::{Error, ErrorKind, Read, Result, Write};
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
/// Shortest token accepted from `SOLIDCRAFT_CONTROL_TOKEN` (hex characters).
pub const MIN_TOKEN_LEN: usize = 32;
/// The port the control channel tries first when `--control` and `SOLIDCRAFT_CONTROL_PORT` give none.
/// Below the ephemeral ranges of Linux (32768+) and Windows/macOS (49152+), so the system never
/// hands it to an outgoing connection.
pub const DEFAULT_PORT: u16 = 27878;
/// Ports tried from [`DEFAULT_PORT`] upward when it is taken (a second window, another program).
pub const PORT_TRIES: u16 = 16;
/// Where the control channel listens, from the launch's `--control`/environment port and the
/// "Let AI agents connect" preference.
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum Listen {
/// Exactly this port (`--control PORT`, `SOLIDCRAFT_CONTROL_PORT`); no fallback.
Exact(u16),
/// [`DEFAULT_PORT`], or the next free one of [`PORT_TRIES`].
Default,
}
/// What a launch listens on. An explicit port wins over the preference, so a scripted launch
/// works with the setting off; with the setting off and no port, nothing listens.
pub fn plan(explicit: Option<u16>, enabled: bool) -> Option<Listen> {
match explicit {
Some(port) => Some(Listen::Exact(port)),
None if enabled => Some(Listen::Default),
None => None,
}
}
/// Bind a loopback-only listener on `first`, or on the next free port when it is taken, up to
/// `tries` ports in all.
pub fn bind_with_fallback(first: u16, tries: u16) -> Result<std::net::TcpListener> {
let mut last = Error::new(ErrorKind::AddrInUse, "no port to try");
for port in (first..=u16::MAX).take(usize::from(tries.max(1))) {
match std::net::TcpListener::bind(("127.0.0.1", port)) {
Ok(l) => return Ok(l),
// In use; Windows reports a port another program holds exclusively as denied.
Err(e) if matches!(e.kind(), ErrorKind::AddrInUse | ErrorKind::PermissionDenied) => last = e,
Err(e) => return Err(e),
}
}
Err(last)
}
/// The folder of the token files: `<data folder>/control` (`SOLIDCRAFT_CONTROL_DIR` replaces it).
fn control_dir() -> Option<PathBuf> {
match solidcraft_geom::env::var_os("CONTROL_DIR").filter(|d| !d.is_empty()) {
Some(d) => Some(PathBuf::from(d)),
None => Some(crate::recovery::data_dir()?.join("control")),
}
}
/// The token file of the app listening on `port`: `<data folder>/control/<port>.token`
/// (`SOLIDCRAFT_CONTROL_DIR` replaces the folder).
pub fn token_path(port: u16) -> Option<PathBuf> {
Some(control_dir()?.join(format!("{port}.token")))
}
/// The discovery file: the port of the most recently started app, so a client with no port
/// (`solidcraft-cli mcp`) finds it. It holds only the port; the token stays in its own file.
pub fn current_port_path() -> Option<PathBuf> {
Some(control_dir()?.join("current.port"))
}
/// Record `port` as the running app's, readable only by the user like the token files.
pub fn write_current_port(port: u16) -> Result<PathBuf> {
let path = current_port_path().ok_or_else(|| Error::new(ErrorKind::NotFound, "no data folder"))?;
write_token_file(&path, &port.to_string())?;
Ok(path)
}
/// The port the discovery file names, if there is one.
pub fn read_current_port() -> Option<u16> {
parse_port(&std::fs::read_to_string(current_port_path()?).ok().filter(|t| t.len() <= 64)?)
}
fn parse_port(text: &str) -> Option<u16> {
text.trim().parse::<u16>().ok().filter(|p| *p != 0)
}
/// Remove the discovery file at exit, unless a later app has taken it over (it names another port).
pub fn remove_current_port(port: u16) {
if read_current_port() == Some(port)
&& let Some(path) = current_port_path()
{
let _ = std::fs::remove_file(path);
}
}
/// A token set on purpose with `SOLIDCRAFT_CONTROL_TOKEN` (test harnesses, sandboxed packages
/// whose data folder the client can't see), if it is long enough.
pub fn env_token() -> Option<String> {
solidcraft_geom::env::var("CONTROL_TOKEN").map(|t| t.trim().to_string()).filter(|t| t.len() >= MIN_TOKEN_LEN)
}
/// The token a client sends to the app on `port`: `explicit` (`--token`), else
/// `SOLIDCRAFT_CONTROL_TOKEN`, else the app's token file.
pub fn client_token(port: u16, explicit: Option<&str>) -> Option<ClientToken> {
if let Some(t) = explicit.map(str::trim).filter(|t| !t.is_empty()) {
return Some(ClientToken { token: t.to_string(), file: None });
}
if let Some(t) = env_token() {
return Some(ClientToken { token: t, file: None });
}
// Read directly, not through `vfs`: the app's own file, outside any agent's folders.
read_token_file(&token_path(port)?)
}
/// A client token and, when it came from a token file, where that file is.
pub struct ClientToken {
pub token: String,
pub file: Option<TokenSource>,
}
/// The token file a client read: its path, when it was written and the process that wrote it.
pub struct TokenSource {
pub path: PathBuf,
pub modified: Option<SystemTime>,
/// From `<port>.pid`: the writer's process id and, on Linux, its start time.
pub writer: Option<(u32, Option<u64>)>,
}
impl ClientToken {
/// The app's `error`, and for a refused token read from a file, which file it was, when it
/// was written and whether the instance that wrote it has exited. Never the token itself.
pub fn explain_error(&self, error: &str) -> String {
let Some(src) = &self.file else { return error.to_string() };
if !error.starts_with("unauthorized") {
return error.to_string();
}
let written = src
.modified
.and_then(|t| t.duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).ok())
.map(|t| crate::crash::utc(t.as_secs()))
.unwrap_or_else(|| "at an unknown time".into());
let age = src.modified.and_then(|t| t.elapsed().ok()).map(|d| format!(" ({} s ago)", d.as_secs())).unwrap_or_default();
let path = src.path.display();
match src.writer.filter(|(pid, start)| writer_exited(*pid, *start)) {
Some((pid, _)) => format!(
"{error}; stale token file from an instance that exited (process {pid}): {path}, written {written}{age}; delete that file or restart SolidCraft"
),
None => format!("{error}; token from {path}, written {written}{age}; if SolidCraft was force-quit, restart it or delete that file"),
}
}
}
/// Files bigger than this are not token files.
const MAX_TOKEN_FILE: u64 = 4096;
fn read_token_file(path: &Path) -> Option<ClientToken> {
let f = std::fs::File::open(path).ok()?;
let modified = f.metadata().ok().and_then(|m| m.modified().ok());
let mut text = String::new();
f.take(MAX_TOKEN_FILE + 1).read_to_string(&mut text).ok()?;
if text.len() as u64 > MAX_TOKEN_FILE {
return None;
}
let token = text.trim();
if token.is_empty() {
return None;
}
let path = std::fs::canonicalize(path).unwrap_or_else(|_| path.to_path_buf());
let writer = read_pid_file(&pid_path(&path));
Some(ClientToken { token: token.to_string(), file: Some(TokenSource { path, modified, writer }) })
}
/// The process file beside the token file `path`: `7878.token` → `7878.pid`.
pub fn pid_path(path: &Path) -> PathBuf {
path.with_extension("pid")
}
/// `<pid> [<start time>]`; anything else (or no file) is no information.
fn read_pid_file(path: &Path) -> Option<(u32, Option<u64>)> {
let mut text = String::new();
std::fs::File::open(path).ok()?.take(256).read_to_string(&mut text).ok()?;
let mut fields = text.split_whitespace();
let pid = fields.next()?.parse::<u32>().ok().filter(|&pid| pid > 0)?;
Some((pid, fields.next().and_then(|s| s.parse().ok())))
}
/// Whether the process that wrote a token file is known to be gone: not running, or its id now
/// belongs to a process that started at another time. Unknown counts as running.
fn writer_exited(pid: u32, start: Option<u64>) -> bool {
process_running(pid) == Some(false) || start.zip(process_start(pid)).is_some_and(|(saved, now)| saved != now)
}
/// Whether process `pid` runs; `None` when that can't be found out.
fn process_running(pid: u32) -> Option<bool> {
#[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
{
if !Path::new("/proc/self").exists() {
return None;
}
match std::fs::metadata(format!("/proc/{pid}")) {
Ok(_) => Some(true),
Err(e) if e.kind() == ErrorKind::NotFound => Some(false),
Err(_) => None,
}
}
#[cfg(all(unix, not(target_os = "linux")))]
{
let output = std::process::Command::new("ps").args(["-p", &pid.to_string(), "-o", "pid="]).output().ok()?;
if output.status.success() {
return Some(true);
}
(output.status.code() == Some(1) && output.stdout.iter().all(u8::is_ascii_whitespace)).then_some(false)
}
#[cfg(windows)]
{
use std::os::windows::process::CommandExt;
let output = std::process::Command::new("tasklist")
.args(["/FI", &format!("PID eq {pid}"), "/FO", "CSV", "/NH"])
.creation_flags(0x0800_0000)
.output()
.ok()?;
if !output.status.success() || output.stdout.is_empty() {
return None;
}
// `"image","pid",…` per process; with no match, a message line without a pid.
let text = String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stdout);
Some(text.lines().any(|line| line.split("\",\"").nth(1).and_then(|s| s.trim_matches('"').parse::<u32>().ok()) == Some(pid)))
}
#[cfg(not(any(unix, windows)))]
{
let _ = pid;
None
}
}
/// Linux: the process's start time (clock ticks after boot), which tells a reused id apart.
fn process_start(pid: u32) -> Option<u64> {
#[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
{
let mut stat = String::new();
std::fs::File::open(format!("/proc/{pid}/stat")).ok()?.take(4096).read_to_string(&mut stat).ok()?;
stat.rsplit_once(')')?.1.split_whitespace().nth(19)?.parse().ok()
}
#[cfg(not(target_os = "linux"))]
{
let _ = pid;
None
}
}
/// `a == b`, taking the same time wherever they differ.
pub fn tokens_match(a: &str, b: &str) -> bool {
let (a, b) = (a.as_bytes(), b.as_bytes());
a.len() == b.len() && a.iter().zip(b).fold(0u8, |acc, (x, y)| acc | (x ^ y)) == 0
}
/// Write `token` to `path`, readable and writable only by the user: the folder is made `0700`
/// and the file `0600` on Unix; on Windows the file's inherited permissions are replaced by one
/// entry for the user (`icacls`) before the token goes in. A file left by an earlier launch is
/// replaced. The process file beside it ([`pid_path`]) records this process, best effort.
pub fn write_token_file(path: &Path, token: &str) -> Result<()> {
let dir = path.parent().ok_or_else(|| Error::new(ErrorKind::InvalidInput, "no folder"))?;
std::fs::create_dir_all(dir)?;
let _ = std::fs::remove_file(path);
let mut opts = std::fs::OpenOptions::new();
opts.write(true).create_new(true);
#[cfg(unix)]
{
use std::os::unix::fs::{OpenOptionsExt, PermissionsExt};
std::fs::set_permissions(dir, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o700))?;
opts.mode(0o600);
}
let mut f = opts.open(path)?;
#[cfg(windows)]
restrict_to_user(path)?;
f.write_all(token.as_bytes())?;
f.write_all(b"\n")?;
f.sync_all()?;
let pid = std::process::id();
let line = process_start(pid).map_or_else(|| format!("{pid}\n"), |start| format!("{pid} {start}\n"));
let _ = std::fs::write(pid_path(path), line);
Ok(())
}
/// Remove a token file this launch wrote, and its process file.
pub fn remove_token_file(path: &Path) {
let _ = std::fs::remove_file(path);
let _ = std::fs::remove_file(pid_path(path));
}
/// How long `icacls` may take (#6145). It finishes at once; on some computers the new process
/// is left suspended (security software holding it), and waiting on it without a limit froze
/// the app.
#[cfg(windows)]
const ICACLS_LIMIT: std::time::Duration = std::time::Duration::from_secs(5);
/// Windows: drop inherited entries and grant only the current user full access. An `icacls`
/// that doesn't finish in time is ended and the file kept as made: it is in the user's own
/// local app data folder, which other users can't read by default.
#[cfg(windows)]
fn restrict_to_user(path: &Path) -> Result<()> {
use std::os::windows::process::CommandExt;
let user = std::env::var("USERNAME").map_err(|_| Error::other("USERNAME is not set"))?;
let domain = std::env::var("USERDOMAIN").ok().filter(|d| !d.is_empty());
let who = domain.map_or(user.clone(), |d| format!("{d}\\{user}"));
let child = std::process::Command::new("icacls")
.arg(path)
.args(["/inheritance:r", "/grant:r", &format!("{who}:F")])
.stdout(std::process::Stdio::null())
.stderr(std::process::Stdio::null())
.creation_flags(0x0800_0000)
.spawn()?;
match wait_within(child, ICACLS_LIMIT)? {
Some(status) if !status.success() => Err(Error::other(format!("icacls failed to restrict {}", path.display()))),
_ => Ok(()),
}
}
/// Wait for `child` at most `limit`: its exit status, or `None` (and the child ended) when it
/// hasn't finished by then.
#[cfg(any(windows, test))]
fn wait_within(mut child: std::process::Child, limit: std::time::Duration) -> Result<Option<std::process::ExitStatus>> {
let start = std::time::Instant::now();
loop {
if let Some(status) = child.try_wait()? {
return Ok(Some(status));
}
if start.elapsed() >= limit {
// Not waited for afterwards: a suspended process may not end at once.
let _ = child.kill();
return Ok(None);
}
std::thread::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_millis(20));
}
}
/// Removes the token file when the app ends.
pub struct TokenFile(pub PathBuf);
impl Drop for TokenFile {
fn drop(&mut self) {
remove_token_file(&self.0);
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
/// #6145: a child that doesn't finish in time is given up on, not waited for forever.
#[cfg(unix)]
#[test]
fn a_slow_child_is_waited_for_only_so_long() {
use std::time::{Duration, Instant};
let start = Instant::now();
let slow = std::process::Command::new("sleep").arg("30").spawn().unwrap();
assert!(wait_within(slow, Duration::from_millis(200)).unwrap().is_none());
assert!(start.elapsed() < Duration::from_secs(5), "{:?}", start.elapsed());
let quick = std::process::Command::new("true").spawn().unwrap();
assert!(wait_within(quick, Duration::from_secs(5)).unwrap().is_some_and(|s| s.success()));
let failing = std::process::Command::new("false").spawn().unwrap();
assert!(wait_within(failing, Duration::from_secs(5)).unwrap().is_some_and(|s| !s.success()));
}
#[test]
fn tokens_compare_whole() {
assert!(tokens_match("abc123", "abc123"));
assert!(!tokens_match("abc123", "abc124"));
assert!(!tokens_match("abc123", "abc12"));
assert!(!tokens_match("", "a"));
}
/// The preference starts the listener by default, off it doesn't, and a port given on the
/// command line or in the environment wins over it either way.
#[test]
fn the_preference_decides_unless_a_port_is_given() {
assert_eq!(plan(None, true), Some(Listen::Default));
assert_eq!(plan(None, false), None);
assert_eq!(plan(Some(7878), false), Some(Listen::Exact(7878)));
assert_eq!(plan(Some(7878), true), Some(Listen::Exact(7878)));
}
/// A taken port falls through to the next free one, on loopback only; a run of taken ports
/// is an error, not a hang.
#[test]
fn a_taken_port_falls_back_to_the_next_free_one() {
let first = bind_with_fallback(DEFAULT_PORT, PORT_TRIES).unwrap();
let a = first.local_addr().unwrap();
assert!(a.ip().is_loopback() && (DEFAULT_PORT..DEFAULT_PORT + PORT_TRIES).contains(&a.port()), "{a}");
let second = bind_with_fallback(a.port(), PORT_TRIES).unwrap();
assert!(second.local_addr().unwrap().port() > a.port());
assert!(bind_with_fallback(a.port(), 1).is_err());
}
#[test]
fn the_discovery_file_holds_a_port() {
assert_eq!(parse_port("27879\n"), Some(27879));
assert_eq!(parse_port("0"), None);
assert_eq!(parse_port("70000"), None);
assert_eq!(parse_port("nope"), None);
let dir = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!("solidcraft-current-port-{}", std::process::id()));
let path = dir.join("current.port");
write_token_file(&path, "27881").unwrap();
assert_eq!(parse_port(&std::fs::read_to_string(&path).unwrap()), Some(27881));
let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir);
}
/// A one-line token file (and one with no process file) still reads.
#[test]
fn a_token_file_reads_with_and_without_its_process_file() {
let dir = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!("solidcraft-control-read-{}", std::process::id()));
std::fs::create_dir_all(&dir).unwrap();
let path = dir.join("7879.token");
std::fs::write(&path, "legacy-token\n").unwrap();
let client = read_token_file(&path).unwrap();
assert_eq!(client.token, "legacy-token");
let src = client.file.as_ref().unwrap();
assert_eq!(src.path, std::fs::canonicalize(&path).unwrap());
assert!(src.modified.is_some() && src.writer.is_none());
std::fs::write(pid_path(&path), "not a pid\n").unwrap();
assert!(read_token_file(&path).unwrap().file.unwrap().writer.is_none());
std::fs::write(&path, "x".repeat(4097)).unwrap();
assert!(read_token_file(&path).is_none());
let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir);
}
/// A refused token names its file and when it was written, never the token.
#[test]
fn unauthorized_error_names_the_token_file() {
let path = PathBuf::from("control/7878.token");
let modified = Some(UNIX_EPOCH + std::time::Duration::from_secs(1_700_000_000));
let client = ClientToken { token: "secret-token".into(), file: Some(TokenSource { path: path.clone(), modified, writer: None }) };
let error = client.explain_error("unauthorized: send the control token");
assert!(error.contains(&format!("token from {}, written 2023-11-14T22:13:20Z (", path.display())), "{error}");
assert!(error.contains("restart it or delete that file") && !error.contains("secret-token"), "{error}");
assert_eq!(client.explain_error("unknown method"), "unknown method");
let explicit = client_token(0, Some("explicit-token")).unwrap();
assert!(explicit.token == "explicit-token" && explicit.file.is_none());
assert_eq!(explicit.explain_error("unauthorized"), "unauthorized");
}
/// A process file naming a process that has exited marks the token file stale.
#[cfg(any(unix, windows))]
#[test]
fn a_token_file_from_an_exited_process_is_stale() {
let mut child = std::process::Command::new(std::env::current_exe().unwrap())
.args(["--exact", "control_auth::tests::tokens_compare_whole"])
.stdout(std::process::Stdio::null())
.spawn()
.unwrap();
let pid = child.id();
assert!(child.wait().unwrap().success());
let source = |writer| Some(TokenSource { path: PathBuf::from("7878.token"), modified: None, writer });
let stale = ClientToken { token: "secret-token".into(), file: source(Some((pid, None))) };
let error = stale.explain_error("unauthorized");
assert!(error.contains(&format!("stale token file from an instance that exited (process {pid}): 7878.token")), "{error}");
assert!(!error.contains("secret-token"));
let live = ClientToken { token: "t".into(), file: source(Some((std::process::id(), process_start(std::process::id())))) };
assert!(!live.explain_error("unauthorized").contains("stale"));
#[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
{
let reused = process_start(std::process::id()).map(|s| s + 1);
let reused = ClientToken { token: "t".into(), file: source(Some((std::process::id(), reused))) };
assert!(reused.explain_error("unauthorized").contains("stale token file"));
}
}
/// The token file is the user's alone, and a client reads it back.
#[cfg(unix)]
#[test]
fn the_token_file_is_private_to_the_user() {
use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
let dir = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!("solidcraft-control-auth-{}", std::process::id()));
let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir);
let path = dir.join("control/7878.token");
std::fs::create_dir_all(dir.join("control")).unwrap();
std::fs::write(&path, "stale").unwrap();
std::fs::set_permissions(&path, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o644)).unwrap();
write_token_file(&path, "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef").unwrap();
let mode = |p: &Path| std::fs::metadata(p).unwrap().permissions().mode() & 0o777;
assert_eq!(mode(&path), 0o600);
assert_eq!(mode(path.parent().unwrap()), 0o700);
assert_eq!(std::fs::read_to_string(&path).unwrap().trim(), "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef");
let writer = read_token_file(&path).unwrap().file.unwrap().writer;
assert_eq!(writer.map(|(pid, _)| pid), Some(std::process::id()));
drop(TokenFile(path.clone()));
assert!(!path.exists() && !pid_path(&path).exists());
let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir);
}
}