# vote-service

> The service's source — `main.go`, `Dockerfile`, `go.mod`, and the `deploy/`
> manifests — was removed from this repository on 2026-09-06. This runbook stays
> because the deployed service is unchanged and the review desk still calls it.
> Recover the source with `git show <pre-removal-sha>:vote-service/`.

Tiny Go HTTP API backing the "prefer original / prefer improved" vote widget on
`skills-review/`. One binary, no external dependencies, one JSON file on disk as
the store — proportionate to workshop-scale traffic, not a general voting
platform.

## Why a separate service

`netcracker.pages.marcospaulo.dev.br` is a static Pages Server: it serves files,
it cannot run server code or remember state. Any real vote count needs a small
stateful service reachable from the visitor's browser, so this lives outside the
static repo and runs as its own pod.

## Anti-abuse: IP, not MAC

A MAC address is a link-layer detail; it never reaches a server across the
internet, so it cannot be used here. "Same source" is approximated by client IP
(`X-Forwarded-For` / `X-Real-IP` behind the ingress, else the raw remote
address). One IP holds at most one active vote per skill — casting again updates
that vote instead of stacking a second one. This is imperfect (NAT, VPNs, shared
networks collapse to one vote; IP changes let someone vote again) but matches
the ask and needs no cookies, accounts, or client secrets. A `X-Voter-Id` header
(a random id the frontend keeps in `localStorage`) is layered on only so a
browser can display "you already voted X" — it is never trusted as the sole
anti-abuse signal, since `localStorage` is trivially resettable.

## API

| Method | Path                   | Body                                              | Response                                                                       |
| :----- | :--------------------- | :------------------------------------------------ | :----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| `GET`  | `/api/votes`           | —                                                 | `{ "tallies": { "<skillId>": { "original": n, "improved": n } } }`             |
| `GET`  | `/api/votes?skillId=X` | —                                                 | adds `"you": "original"\|"improved"` when the caller's IP already voted on `X` |
| `POST` | `/api/votes`           | `{"skillId":"X","choice":"original"\|"improved"}` | `{"skillId","original","improved","you"}`                                      |
| `GET`  | `/healthz`             | —                                                 | `200`                                                                          |

## Run locally

```bash
go run . # PORT=8080 VOTE_DB_PATH=/tmp/votes.json ALLOWED_ORIGIN=http://localhost:4173
```

## Build and publish the image

Pushed to this cluster's Nexus registry (docker-hosted repo, anonymous read
already enabled cluster-wide — no `imagePullSecrets` needed). Push host and pull
host differ because Nexus is reached from a workstation via its NodePort but
from inside the cluster via its Service DNS name:

```bash
docker build -t localhost:30892/ai-for-dummies-vote-service:latest .
docker push localhost:30892/ai-for-dummies-vote-service:latest
# pods pull the same image as: nexus-service.nexus.svc.cluster.local:8082/ai-for-dummies-vote-service:latest
```

## Deploy (microk8s)

The `ai-for-dummies-vote-data` PVC uses `microk8s-hostpath`, whose PVs carry a
`nodeAffinity` for whichever node first binds them — so scheduling and storage
must agree on one node. This runs on `kubernets` (the control-plane node that
hosts the rest of the cluster's workloads), pinned via `nodeSelector` in
`deployment.yaml`.

kubelet's image pulls run in the _host_ network namespace and there is no
`certs.d/hosts.toml` entry for `localhost:30892`, so a plain pull of the Nexus
ref fails (`no basic auth credentials`). Push to Nexus for a durable off-node
copy, then import straight into that node's containerd store and let
`imagePullPolicy: Never` skip the network pull entirely — the same pattern the
`pragent-webhook` image uses in this cluster:

```bash
docker save localhost:30892/ai-for-dummies-vote-service:latest -o /tmp/vote-service.tar
/snap/microk8s/current/bin/ctr --address /var/snap/microk8s/common/run/containerd.sock \
  --namespace k8s.io image import /tmp/vote-service.tar
# use microk8s's own bundled ctr, not the host's — different containerd major
# versions speak incompatible client/server protocols (`unknown service
# containerd.services.streaming.v1.Streaming` otherwise)

microk8s kubectl apply -f deploy/deployment.yaml   # namespace + Deployment + PVC + Service
microk8s kubectl apply -f deploy/ingress.yaml
microk8s kubectl -n ai-for-dummies rollout restart deploy ai-for-dummies-vote
```

Re-run the `docker save`/`ctr image import` pair after every image rebuild —
`imagePullPolicy: Never` means the cluster never fetches a newer tag on its own,
and a `rollout restart` is what picks the new image up.

## Public exposure

Public traffic reaches the cluster through **Caddy on the Oracle VPS over
Tailscale**, which is how all ~21 public hosts in this account are served
(`langfuse`, `pragent-dashboard`, `vault`, …) — _not_ through the cloudflared
tunnel. The tunnel's public-hostname routes are dashboard-managed and the DNS
API token cannot write them, so the Caddy path is also the only one that can be
automated end to end.

```bash
cf-dns add ai-for-dummies-vote A 129.148.56.8    # DNS-only (grey cloud), like every other Caddy host
```

Caddy block (`/etc/caddy/Caddyfile` on the VPS, local copy
`~/scripts/Caddyfile`):

```caddyfile
ai-for-dummies-vote.marcospaulo.dev.br {
    tls {
        dns cloudflare <CF_TOKEN>
    }
    reverse_proxy 100.74.17.70:80 {
        header_up Host {host}
        header_up X-Client-IP {remote_host}
    }
}
```

It proxies to port `80` (not a NodePort): the cluster's nginx ingress runs on
`hostNetwork` on `kubernets` and routes by `Host`.

### Why `X-Client-IP`

The ingress controller runs with `use-forwarded-headers` **off** (the microk8s
default — `nginx-load-balancer-microk8s-conf` has no `data`). nginx therefore
_overwrites_ `X-Forwarded-For` and `X-Real-IP` with its own downstream peer,
which is the VPS's tailnet address `100.67.25.57`. Every visitor would collapse
into one voter, and since one IP holds at most one active vote per skill, each
skill would only ever hold a single vote in total — the anti-abuse rule would
silently become a hard cap.

Rather than flip `use-forwarded-headers` globally (it would change client-IP
handling for every other ingress in the cluster), Caddy stamps the true remote
address into `X-Client-IP`, a non-standard header nginx forwards untouched, and
`clientIP()` reads it first. `header_up` sets it unconditionally, so a public
client cannot spoof it; the trust placed in it is exactly the trust already
placed in `X-Forwarded-For`.

Verified after deploy: requests from two distinct sources are recorded as two
separate votes rather than overwriting one another.

## Frontend wiring

`skills-review/index.html` sets `window.SKILLS_REVIEW_VOTE_API` to
`https://ai-for-dummies-vote.marcospaulo.dev.br`; keep it in sync with
`ALLOWED_ORIGIN` in `deployment.yaml`
(`https://netcracker.pages.marcospaulo.dev.br`), which is the real caller
boundary — CORS restricts which origin's browser code may call the API, not
which network can reach it.

`replicas: 1` and `strategy: Recreate` are deliberate: the store is one file on
one `ReadWriteOnce` PVC, so two pods writing it concurrently would race. Scale
up only after moving the store to something that supports concurrent writers
(e.g. SQLite on a shared volume with proper locking, or Postgres) — not needed
at this traffic scale.
